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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
THE STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff-Respondent,
-vsVALENTINO ARCHULETTA,

Case No.
12900

Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEl\IENT OF THE NATURE
OF THE CASE
The appellant, Valentino Archuletta, appeals
from a conviction of robbery in the Third Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The appellant, Valentino Archuletta, was found
guilty by a jury of the crime of robbery on February
1, 1972, and was thereafter sentenced to the Utah State
Prison on February 23, 1972. Stays of execution having been granted from time to time, appellant was committed to the Utah State Prison on May 10, 1972.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction and
judgment rendered below and a remand of the case for
a new trial.

STATEl\IENT OF FACTS
l\Ir. Helmuth K. Sahm testified that on November
13, 1971, he was driving a cab and he picked up Valen-

tino Archuletta. (T. 13) He further testified that appellant got in the back seat of the cab ( T. 15) and when
the. cab approached the address appellant gave Mr.
Sahm, appellant told him how to get there. (T. 16-18)
.l\Ir. Sahm said that the cab ended up in a back alley
(T. 18) and he then felt a belt go around his neck with
pressure being applied. (T. 18) He testified that when
he asked what was wanted, appellant said "what do you
think?" ( T. 18) He testified that he took out his wallet
and handed it to appellant, who took it. ( T. 19) lVIr.
Sahm testified that he received no fee in advance for
the fare. (T. 22)
Yalentino J-\rchuletta testified that he got in the
cab with l\Ir. Sahm on November 13, rnn, and that he
was not feeling well. ( T. 54) He laid down on the back
seat and the next thing he remembered was l\:Ir. Sahm
attempting to get into his (appellant's) pocket. (T. 55)
Appellant testified that he had his belt off when he
got in the cab because he had been sleeping at his
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father's where the cab picked him up, (T. 57) and the
belt was uncomfortable. Appellant further testified
that when he felt l\Ir. Sahm attempting to get into his
pocket he asked what he was doing and received no
answer. (T. 55) The cab driver then asked for $1.75 for
the fare or he (the cab driver) would take appellant to
the police. ( T. 56) Appellant said l\Ir. Sahm turned
around as if to hit him, at which point he hooked the
belt around l\Ir. Sahm's ann. (T. 57) He described a
struggle and how the belt ended up around Mr. Sahm.
(T. 57-58)
Mr. Sahm handed back his wallet to appellant as
he was getting out of the cab. (T. 58) He took the
wallet and threw it without examining it, saying he
wanted out of there. ( T. 59, GO, 80) .l\I r. Sahm stated
that appellant <lid not specifically ask for the wallet
and that he "assumed" he wanted his wallet. (T. 30)
l\Ir. Sahm testified that appellant made no effort to retrieve the belt. ( T. 33)
Appellant's father testified that he had paid Mr.
Sahm in advance for the fare (T. 40), contrary to Mr.
Sahm's insistance that he received no fare. (T. 22, 25)
Prior to the
with the trial in
t-shirt and pants
tons. ('I'. 3) The

trial appellant objected to proceeding
jail clothes, appellant wearing a jail
and an old gray shirt with two butcourt below denied the motion. (T. 3)
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AllGUl\IEXT
POINT I
THE COUHT llELOVV EIOlED IN OVERRULING APPELLANT'S OBJECT ION TO PROCEEDING "TITH THE TRIAL 'VHILE
'VAS IN JAIL CLOTHES.
Appellant contends that it was error on the part
of the court below to m·errule appellant's objection to
proceeding with the trial while he was garbed in Salt
I ,ake County .Jail clothes, and the error caused appellant to have an unfair trial.
In Atkins v. Statr, 210 So.2d 9 (Fla. 1968), a
robbery case, the sole issue was the propriety of proceeding with the trial while the defendant was in prison
garb. The court, prior to the trial, told the jury that
the defendant was wearing what he was because he was
issued such clothes as an inmate of the jail. The court
told the jury his attire was not an indication that he
had been convicted. The defendant objected to the trial
while he was so clothed and the objection was overruled.
The court on appeal pointed out that the defendant
was hasically claiming that he was denied a fair trial.
The Florida court quoted the general rule as follows,
citing 21 Am. Jur. 2d, Criminal Law,§ 239:
Since the defendant, pending and during his
trial, is still presumed innocent, he is entitled
to be brought before the court with the appearance, dignity, and self-respect of a free and
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innocent man, except as the necessary safety
and decomm of the court may otherwise require. He is therefore entitled to wear civilian
clothes rather than prison clothing at this trial.
It is improper to bring him into the presence
of the jury which is to try him, or the venire
from which his trial jury will be drawn,
clothed as a convict.
In that case, howe,·er, the court held that the court's
cautionary instructions kept the defendant from being
seriously prejudiced. However, the court did say that
in another case where the guilt of the defendant was
not so clear, "reversible error may be found in the trial
of an accused dressed in prison attire." However, the
dissent felt that forcing a defendant to trial in such
clothes
constitutes prejudicial reversible error as a
matter of law. I can hardly conceive of any
action of a trial court that would so strongly
infringe upon that most fundamental rightthe presumption of innocence.
Another robbery case is 1lliller v. State, 457 S.W.
2d 848 (Ark. 1970) . The robbery was unrebutted, unlike appellant's case, but the defendant was in prison
clothes at. trial with the numbers visible on his shirt and
trousers. The defendant moved to continue the trial or
have the court take some other steps, both of which were
denied. The court held that a continuance should have
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been granted to make arrangements for civilian attire,
and that absent waiYer a defendant should not be forced
to trial in his prison clothes. The court reversed the conviction.
A Colorado case, Eaddy v. People, 115 Colo. 488,
174 P.2d 717 (194G), has often been cited as the leading case for the proposition that one should be tried in
civilian clothes. In that murder case, the defendant wore
clothes that said "County Jail" upon them. The court
said, 17 4 P .2d at 718; in reversing the conviction:
It is difficult to find any distinction, as to the
humiliation involved, between requiring a
prisoner to wear the words "County Jail"
branded upon his clothing and requiring him
to wear them on a placard attached about his
neck; either is a mockery, an indignity and a
humiliation not consistent with innocence and
freedom. The presumption of innocence requires the garb of innocence.

In Commonwealth v. Keeler, 216 Pa.Super. 193,
2().1 A.2d 407 ( 1970) , the <lefend ant tried to get civilian
clothes for hi1s trial for illegal possession of a gun. He
moved for a continuance which was denied and was
place<l before the venire panel while the jury was being selected. The court pointed out that the defendant
gave the appearance of one whom the State regarded
as deserving to be so attired. The court further said that
the wearing of prison garb in the courtroom
also demeans the defendant in his own mind.
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It makes him feel that, although presumed to
be innocent, he has already lost his dignity by
the very fact of arrest and charge.

The court said that no purpose was served by trying
the defendant in prison garb and that the trial court
abused its discretion in not continuing the trial. The trial
court should have procured civilian clothes for the defendant if none were available, the court said in reversing the conviction for a new trial. See also for the
same rule that a defendant tried over his objection in
jail clothes is entitled to a new trial, Ephraim v. State,
471 S. "\V .2d 798 (Tex. 1971) .
SeYeral courts have said that the presumption of
innocence requires that one be tried in civilian clothes,
but have held that either because there was no proper
objection made or because the evidence of guilt was
overwhelming, reversal was not required. See, e.g. Collins v. State, 70 Okl.Cr. 340, 106 P.2d 773 (1940);
Sharpe v. State, 119 Ga. App. 222, 166 S.E.2d 645
(1969); People v. Shaw, 381 Mich. 467, 164 N.W.2d 7
(1969).
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has
held as follows. In Hernandez v. Beto, 443 F .2d 634
(5th Cir. 1971) the defendant was tried in a white
t-shirt that had "Harris County Jail" stamped in the
front and the same on the trousers. No objection was
made prior to trial, but the court reversed and remanded
the case saying:
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There is little doubt in the court's mind that
negatiYe inferences can be, and more than
likely are, created in the minds of the jurors
·when the accused is brought into court and
tried in prison clothing. 443 11"'.2d at 636.
Trying a defendant in prison clothes "infringes a fun.
damental right-the presumption of innocence." See
also Brooks v. State, 381 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1967).
Clearly most of the cases dealing with the problem
deal with it from the standpoint of the presumption of
innocence and the infringement of this important prin·
ciple that occurs when one is tried in jail or prison
clothes. One court has dealt with the problem from the
angle of equal protection of the laws. In People v. Za·
pata, 220 Cal. App. 2d 903, 34 Cal. Rptr. 171 ( 1963),
the court said, concerning a trial to a judge with the de·
fendant in jail denims:
A defendant who can afford bail appears for
trial in the hest array he can muster. He may
be a veritable satyr clad like Hyperion himself. Imposition of jail clothing on a defendant who cannot afford bail subjects him to
inferior treatment. He suffers a disadvantage
as a result of his poverty. Our traditions do not
brook such disadvantages ....
In the case, however, the court found no prejudice in
the trial for possession of narcotics hefore a judge with·
out a jury.
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Appellant contends that his trial in the garb he was
wearing was not fair in that the presumption of innocence was abrogated. In a case of this nature, the jury's
duty was simp]y deciding who was telling the truth,
Mr. Sahm or appellant. That is, where the truth and
veracity of the witness was the crucial aspect of the
case, and it was the jury's duty to decide if :Mr. Sahm
was te11ing the truth when he said appellant robbed
him, or if appe11ant was telling the truth about the
struggle inside l\fr. Sahm's cab, the sheer appearance
of the witnesses was no doubt crucial in the jury's determination as to which one to believe. All things being
equal, it is appellant's contention that the jury would
more likely believe .Mr. Sahm than him because of the
differences in appearance and the resulting inferences
that would arise in the jury's deliberations ..Most simply
stated, and while a barren record can not accurately describe appellant's appearance at trial, appellant conten<ls that he should not have been tried in jail clothes
and it was reversible error to allow the trial to proceed
when he was so attired and he is entitled to a new trial
in dignity and self-respect and in the "garb of innocence," to accompany the presumption of innocence.
CONCLUSION
For the reason above stated, that the court below
erred in denying appellant's objection to proceeding
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with the trial while he was in jail clothes, appellant respectfully submits that he is entitled to a reversal of the
conviction and a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

BRUCE C. LUBECK
Attorney for Appellant

